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Did the Devil Make Them Do It? 
The Effects of Religion in Public Goods and Trust Games 
 
 
“...God loves a cheerful giver.” – 2 Corinthians 9:7 (New International Version) 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Social scientists have long considered religion to be an important determinant of individual behavior and 
economic outcomes (e.g., Weber 1930).  For example, at the individual level, religious adherence is associated with 
improved mental and physical health, marital stability, reduced incidences of criminal and delinquent activity, and 
lower rates of alcohol and drug abuse (Iannacone 1998).  Looking across countries, Barro and McCleary (2003) find 
that the prevalence of certain religions and religious beliefs (e.g., the afterlife) within a country is related to 
economic growth.  In short, religion and religiosity are associated with a variety of positive individual and social 
indicators.  But why is this so? 
One explanation for this empirical regularity is that religion may be a key component of social capital 
(Putnam 2000).1  For example, anthropologists have argued collective rituals may promote cooperation and 
cohesiveness (e.g., Ruffle and Sosis 2007); further, in a multinational survey, Guiso et al. (2003) find that religious 
affiliation and participation are associated with attitudes that are more favorable toward cooperation.  In addition, 
survey evidence from the U.S. demonstrates that religious participation is strongly correlated with both charitable 
giving and volunteering (Putnam 2000, and Brooks 2003 and 2005).  Of course, the existence of an association 
between religious adherence and increased cooperative behavior is not entirely surprising, given that all major 
religions exhort their followers (to some degree or another) to show compassion and generosity toward others.2  In 
this sense, religious faith may be considered a source of “warm glow” feelings or “social preferences” that induces 
individuals to engage in unselfish but socially beneficial behavior (Andreoni 1993, Fehr and Fischbacher 2002 and 
                                                 
1Social capital has in turn linked to all manner of salutary outcomes, from greater economic growth to 
reduced political corruption, and from reduced mortality rates and to decreased abdominal weight gain; for a review 
and discussion of the (perhaps overhyped) consequences of social capital, see Mellor and Milyo (2005).  
2Eckel and Grossman (2004) elaborate on this point; for a contemporary example of such exhortations, see 
Wallis (2005), who argues that Christian values should lead the faithful to support generous entitlements and 
redistributive policies. 
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Charness and Rabin 2002). In fact, Orbell et al. (1992) confirm what they term a “folk sociology” belief that 
religious individuals are in general more cooperative by surveying human subject participants in a prisoners’ 
dilemma experiment; they report a widespread belief among all subjects that religious partners would be more likely 
to cooperate in the prisoners’ dilemma experiment. 
It is tempting to infer from this empirical literature that religious individuals have more other-regarding 
preferences; however, Iannaccone (1998) cautions these observational studies may suffer from omitted variable or 
selection biases that generate spurious associations between religion and cooperation.  For example, consider recent 
studies of survey data by Brooks (2003) and Schwadel (2005) which demonstrate that both religious affiliation and 
the intensity of religious participation are associated with increased voluntary contributions to charitable causes, 
even after controlling for income and other demographic attributes.3  Such evidence does not necessarily indicate 
that religious individuals have systematically different preferences toward giving than non-religious individuals.  
Instead, it may simply be the case that some people find themselves in social environments that are more rewarding 
of or conducive to other-directed behavior, which induces them to give more of both their money (to charity) and 
their time (to religious participation).  Therefore, it is possible that religious people do not have different 
preferences so much as they have different circumstances.  In that case, unobservable differences in social 
environment or circumstances confound the association between religion and charitable giving. 
  Of course, it is by no means self-evident that religion and religiosity should have only positive 
consequences for social interactions.  First, and perhaps most obviously, religious differences within and across 
societies have historically been the source of much discord.4  Second, some surveys demonstrate that religious 
adherence is also associated with racist, sexist, and vengeful attitudes (Guiso et al. 2003 and Greer et al. 2005).  
Finally, survey evidence on religion and generalized social trust is more mixed than that for giving.  While raw 
                                                 
3Although this same survey evidence also suggests that religious adherents (especially Protestants) give less 
to secular causes; consistent with this, Eckel and Grossman (2003 and 2005) find that religious and nonreligious 
participants in laboratory experiments do not behave differently when given the opportunity to make charitable 
contributions to secular causes.   
4In addition, several recent studies find that population heterogeneity in ethnicity, income or race is 
associated with less support for public good provision (Alesina et al. 1999), reduced trust in others (Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2002) and lower rates of voluntary participation in membership organizations (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). 
 Although none of these studies tests the consequences of religious heterogeneity, it is not unreasonable to 
conjecture that religious differences may well have similar effects as other sources of population heterogeneity. 
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correlations suggest that religious adherents in the U.S. are much more trusting than others,5 Welch et al. (2004) find 
the opposite after controlling for income, education and other demographic characteristics.  Also, some authors have 
argued that Catholicism in particular may reduce social trust (La Porte et al. 1997, Inglehart 1999, and Putnam 
1993).  On the other hand, Guiso et al. (2003) find that religious affiliation and participation among all Christians is 
associated with increased generalized social trust (albeit more so for Protestants than Catholics).6 
Aside from these caveats, it is not inconceivable that religious individuals are indeed “different” in their 
preferences or beliefs in others in a way that makes them more cooperative, generous or trusting.  First, it may be 
that people who are “hard-wired” with more other-regarding preferences are more likely to join religious groups; or 
exposure to religious teaching may serve to remind and train people to be more other-regarding.  Finally, a sincere 
belief in the after-life may well fundamentally alter how religious individuals perceive the payoffs to social 
interactions. 
Putting all of this into the context of an indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma, we seek to answer 
whether the religious individuals cooperate or trust more than others when the “social environment” is controlled 
across religious and non-religious individuals.  The answer to this question speaks to whether religion alters the way 
in which people perceive the benefits and costs of social interactions, as opposed to religious people either finding 
themselves or sorting themselves into circumstances that are more conducive to cooperation and trust. To answer 
this question, we control the “social environment” of religious and non-religious people by means of human-subject 
experiments. 
                                                 
5 Our calculations from the combined 1972-2002 General Social Survey indicate that individuals who 
self-identify some religious affiliation (versus none) are 66% more likely to agree that “most people can be trusted” 
(p<.01); these survey-based definitions of both “religious affiliation” and “social trust” are commonplace in the 
literature. 
6Also, see Goldin and Katz (1999) and Glaeser et al. (2000) on the association between Lutheranism and 
trust, as well as Arrunda (2004) on differences in trust between Catholics and Protestants. 
In adopting this approach to investigate whether religion influences behavior we join a limited but growing 
experimental literature on the behavioral consequences of religion (Eckel and Grossman 2003, 2004; Ruffle and 
Sosis 2007; and Johansson-Stenman et al 2005).  Specifically, we examine whether religious affiliation and 
participation are associated with individual actions in two familiar experimental settings: a public goods game and a 
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bilateral trust game.  In the first set of experiments, we test whether religious adherents are more likely to contribute 
to a group account when such actions are contrary to self-interest.  In the latter set of experiments, we test whether 
religious adherents choose to trust strangers or to behave in a trustworthy fashion, despite monetary incentives to the 
contrary. 
In the next section, we review the nascent literature on the effects of religion and religiosity in experiments. 
 We then describe our experimental and survey design, and present our findings.  We conclude with a discussion of 
these findings and suggestions for future research. 
2.  Religion in Laboratory Experiments 
Several investigators have examined the effects of culture, or even social capital, on individual behavior in 
laboratory experiments (e.g., Oosterbeek et al. 2004, and Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2004), but relatively little 
attention has been paid to religion as a determinant of subjects’ behavior. In fact, only four previous studies (all 
using non-American subjects) have examined the effect of religion in either a canonical public goods game or trust 
game;7 we review each of these below. 
                                                 
7The classic public goods game experiment is described in Marwell and Ames (1979), while the 
“investment” experiment described in Berg et al.. (1995) has become the standard model for bilateral trust games.   
Fehr et al. (2003) examines how a wide range of socio-demographic characteristics among German 
experimental subjects relates to behavior in a classic bilateral trust game; in particular, they observe that Catholics 
are much more trusting in these experiments.  However, religion is not the focus of their study, so the authors do not 
explore further the effects of attendance at services.  Tan and Vogel (forthcoming) also study German subjects in 
trust games, where the “trustors” (i.e., first-movers) are provided with information on the religiosity of the “trustee’ 
(i.e., second movers).  Interestingly, they find that amounts sent by trustors to trustees are positively and 
significantly associated with the latter’s degree of religiosity; this behavior is consistent with the existence of the 
“folk sociology” belief that religious individuals are more cooperative, generous, and trusting (Orbel et al. 1992). 
Ruffle and Sosis (2007) posit that individuals engage in costly religious rituals as a means to promote trust 
and cooperation among members of the religious sect (i.e., “in-group” cooperation).  These authors recruited 
subjects from both secular and religious Israeli kibbutzim and then conducted several two-person common pool 
experiments.  Overall, Orthodox males who go to synagogue daily make significantly smaller claims on the 
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common pool than either Orthodox females or non-Orthodox subjects.  Because women do not play as prominent a 
role in Orthodox rituals as males, Ruffle and Sosis interpret their findings as evidence that religious ritual does 
facilitate in-group cooperation.  However, these results are also consistent with the claim that religiosity itself is 
associated with less selfish behavior.  This is because the subjects in this experiment did not know the identity of 
their partners, so could not know whether they were cooperating within group or not. 
The notion that religion fosters different behavior within group versus without also motivates the fourth 
study, Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005).  These authors conduct two-person trust games using Hindu and Muslim 
subjects from rural Bangladesh.  Neither Hindus nor Muslims exhibit preferential treatment to partners from their 
own group.  However, this study does not explore differences in trust between religious and nonreligious subjects. 
Aside from these four studies, there are a few studies that explore the effects of religion on other-regarding 
behavior in familiar experimental settings.  Orbel et al. (1992) appear to be the first investigators to explicitly 
examine the behavior of religious versus non-religious subjects in a human subject experiment; they find that 
religion has no effect on contributions in a multi-person prisoners’ dilemma, although religious attendance among 
Mormons was correlated with cooperative behavior (half of the experiments in this study were conducted in Logan, 
Utah). 
Eckel and Grossman (2003 and 2004) conduct several dictator games in which subjects unilaterally choose 
whether to give money to one of several listed secular charities.  Eckel and Grossman find no significant difference 
in the propensity to make contributions between subjects who do or do not attend religious services regularly, 
although religious subjects are significantly more responsive when these donations to secular groups are subsidized.  
Tan (2006) also explores the effects of religion and specific religious beliefs (e.g., belief in God, belief in an 
afterlife, etc.) on German subjects behavior in dictator and ultimatum games; overall he concludes that religion has 
no effect on other-regarding behavior. 
In short, what little is known about how religion influences behavior in common experimental games is 
somewhat mixed. Further, no previous studies on religion and cooperation and trust have utilized American subjects 
in conventional public goods and trust games; in contrast, much of the empirical evidence discussed in the previous 
section is from American survey data.  We examine how religious affiliation and attendance influences behavior 
among American experimental subjects in these canonical public goods and trust games. 
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Finally, while the question of whether religious affiliation and participation are associated with 
contributions and trust is interesting in itself, this study also takes a step toward addressing potential concerns about 
the irreligious nature of the pool of subjects typically employed in economic experiments (i.e., college students).  
While many economists have previously been concerned about the composition of subject pools with regard to 
disproportionate exposure to economics instruction (e.g., Frey and Meier 2003 and 2005) or even liberal political 
ideology (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2005a), much less is known about the importance of religion and religiosity 
in determining laboratory behavior in public goods or trust games. 
3. Study Design 
In two previous studies, we generated data on voluntary contributions in a public goods  experiment 
(Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2008) and on trusting and trustworthy behavior in a bilateral trust experiment 
(Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2006).  These experiments shared in common many features, but most importantly 
identical surveys were administered to subjects in both sets experiments.  The survey was composed of 42 questions 
on demographic characteristics, social and political attitudes, religious affiliation, and participation in religious 
services.  In this study we analyze the data from these experiments in conjunction with the survey responses on 
religion. 
The relevant survey questions for this study asked subjects to self-identify as Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, 
Muslim, some other religion, or no religion.8  In addition, we asked subjects how many times in a typical month 
they participated in organized religious services.  These questions are similar to those included in major opinion 
surveys, and so are consistent with how much of the previous social science literature measures both religion and 
religiosity. 
We recruited 144 subjects from undergraduate classes at the College of William and Mary; each subject 
participated in the survey and either a public goods experiment or a trust experiment.  The experimental sessions 
were conducted with groups of eight subjects;  games were repeated for 30 rounds and feedback about others’ 
decisions was provided at the end of each round. At the completion of each session, we randomly selected one round 
for the purpose of determining subjects’ payments.  In the public goods sessions, subjects earned an average of 
                                                 
8Because of the small number of subjects identifying themselves as either Jewish, Muslin or some other 
religion, we elected to pool these three responses into one category in our subsequent empirical analysis. 
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$19.57;  in the trust sessions, earnings averaged $22.21.  We administered the survey at the conclusion of the 
experiment, while subjects waited for their earnings to be calculated and distributed.9 
The public goods experiment follows the design introduced by Marwell and Ames (1979).  Each person in 
a group of eight was given ten tokens to divide between a private account and a group account (i.e., the public good). 
 The private account earned a return of $1 to the individual, while each token contributed to the group account 
earned $0.25 for all eight members of the group.  Consequently, it is individually rational to contribute all tokens in 
the private account (since $1 > $0.25), but socially inefficient to do so (since 8*$0.25 = $2 > $1). 
We also conducted 12 sessions of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe’s (1995) investment game (a.k.a., the trust 
game).  In this bilateral trust experiment, all subjects were endowed with $10, and then randomly paired off, with 
half of the subjects designated as first movers, and their partners designated as second movers.  Within each pair, 
the first mover had the chance to pass some, all or none of their endowment to his anonymous partner.  Any money 
passed was then tripled before being received by the second mover.  Finally, the second mover was allowed to 
return to the first mover some, all or none of the money received.  At the conclusion of each round of paired play, 
subjects were randomly re-assigned new partners (although the subjects remained in the role of first or second mover 
throughout the experiment).  Consequently, it is straightforward to show using backward induction that the Nash 
equilibrium for this game is that no money will be passed in the first stage (since second movers have no incentive to 
return money in the second stage).10 
The public goods and trust experiments share one other important feature; in some sessions of both 
experiments, we varied the fixed show-up payment given to subjects.  This was done in order to induce 
heterogeneity among the subjects in these sessions; elsewhere, we analyze the effects of this induced inequality on 
contributions and trust (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2008 and 2006).  The basic experimental design employed in 
both the public goods and trust experiments is described in Table 1.  Each session was divided into three blocks of 
ten rounds.  Each block represented a different distribution of fixed show-up payments, although the average fixed 
                                                 
9It is possible that survey responses are influenced by subjects’ experiences in the experimental sessions; 
however, we know of no previous study that tests for the presence of order effects in the timing of the survey and 
experiment. 
10This analysis applies to a one-shot game, but can also be extended to a finitely-repeated game with a 
certain endpoint. 
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payment was $7.50 in each block.11  Because of this aspect of the experiments, our subsequent regression analysis 
will control for the amount of the fixed payment received by each subject; in addition, we also test whether religion 
and religiosity have different effects in the sessions with induced inequality, versus the control sessions (in which all 
subjects were given the same show-up payment). 
The variation in fixed payments to subjects is not purely accidental; this feature of the experiments allows 
us to test whether the association between religion and either public goods contributions or trust is conditioned on 
the artificially egalitarian environment of the experimental lab.  A frequent concern with examining the effects of 
any sort of social conditioning on behavior in experiments is the possible influence of the laboratory setting itself.  
For example, religious teachings typically emphasize compassion to the less fortunate (e.g., the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan); for this reason, the potential influence of religion on behavior may not be manifest in a strictly 
egalitarian environment.  Of course, financial constraints prohibit us from being able to make substantively large 
changes to subjects’ wealth; nevertheless, the induced heterogeneity employed here has been shown to influence 
subjects’ behavior (see especially, Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2008).  
4.  Results 
We first present descriptive statistics and conduct non-parametric tests on the average play of each 
individual in our study (see Table 2).12  From the public goods experiment, we report mean values of the number of 
tokens contributed by subjects to the group account; we consider such contributions to reflect the value subjects 
place on the welfare of other subjects.   From the trust experiments, we report mean amounts sent by first movers, a 
measure of the level of trust that player has in his or her randomly-matched partner.  Finally, we also examine the 
mean of the “return ratio” (the ratio of amount returned to amount available) among the second movers, which can 
be interpreted as the trustworthiness of these subjects.  For each subject, we calculate the average decision over 30 
rounds, and we then average those values over the subjects that participated in that feature of the experiment and 
                                                 
11 It is a standard practice to give subjects a fixed payment for showing up for an experiment. This payment 
supplements what subjects earn based on their decisions and serves as a lower bound on their compensation for 
participating in the experiment. 
12Three subjects did not report information on their religious affiliation or participation; these subjects are 
dropped from our empirical analysis.  One of these subjects participated in the public goods experiment, and two 
participated in the trust experiment (both were second movers). 
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provided sufficient responses to the survey.  The means for the full sample are reported in Table 2, along with 
means by the subjects’ religious affiliation and participation in religious services. 
The most striking finding from Table 2 is the absence of much variation in contributions, amount sent or 
amount returned by religious affiliation or participation.  In fact, Mann-Whitney tests for each subgroup reveal no 
significant differences in group account contributions for any one group of subjects relative to the remaining 
subjects; likewise for the amount sent variable and the return ratio variable.  Even so, the means listed in Table 2 do 
suggest some weak patterns in the data.  For example, Catholics appear slightly less generous than Protestants, 
although this is not reflected in the return ratio.  Also, there is some evidence of a gradient in voluntary 
contributions as participation in religious services increases, albeit this is only among subjects  
identifying a religious affiliation.  Individuals reporting infrequent religious attendance actually contribute less than 
nonreligious individuals. 
In contrast to the analysis above, we now conduct multivariate regression analysis of individual decisions as 
a function of individual characteristics and the experimental design.  Because each block is associated with a 
particular distribution of fixed payments and consists of ten repetitions of the same game, we take as our unit of 
observation an individual’s average actions within each block of ten games.  Further, because this leaves us with 
three potentially non-independent observations per subject, we correct all of our estimated standard errors for 
clustering at the subject-level. 
In Table 3, we report the results of ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variable is the 
average number of tokens contributed by an individual subject per ten-round block. In each case, we control for 
subject’s race, gender, and fixed payment amount; we also include controls for the order of the fixed payment 
treatment (egalitarian, skewed or symmetric), and whether the specific block was conducted with an unequal 
distribution or not.13  Finally, we examine several models that include indicators for any religious affiliation, type of 
religious affiliation, and self-reported frequency of attendance at religious services; none of these indicators is 
individually significant. 
                                                 
13We did not observe any significant differences between the two inequality treatments, so we pool these 
observations and include only a single indicator variable for ease of exposition in subsequent tables. 
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In Table 3, the indicators for religion are neither individually nor jointly significant.14  The estimated 
coefficient on Protestant affiliation is larger than for other denominations, but all of these estimated coefficients on 
religious affiliation are quite small relative to the mean contribution to the group account (which is 2.72).  The 
indicators for attendance at religious services are also not individually significant.  However, among subjects that 
attend religious services, we observe some evidence of a gradient in contributions associated with frequency of 
attendance.  Further, the attendance indicators in Models 3 and 4 are jointly significant (at p<.10 and p<.05, 
respectively).  Using the estimates from Model 4 in Table 3, subjects who do not attend religious services (a group 
that includes both religious and nonreligious subjects) contribute about 0.8 more tokens than religious subjects that 
attend religious services once per month.  This latter group also contributes about 1.7 fewer tokens than subjects 
with the highest rates of attendance. 
Next, we conduct a similar analysis for the trust experiment.  In Table 4, we report the results of identical 
models, except that the dependent variable is now the average number of tokens sent by the first mover.  Once 
again, the religious affiliation indicators are neither individually nor jointly statistically significant, and there is little 
difference in behavior between Catholics and Protestants.  However, in contrast to voluntary contributions, the 
estimated effects of religious affiliation are now consistently negative for the amount sent in the trust experiment.  
Regarding frequency of attendance at services, we no longer observe a gradient associated with attendance among 
religious subjects, nor are the attendance indicators individually or jointly significant.  Nevertheless, it is striking 
that high-attendance religious subjects send about 2.5 fewer tokens on average compared to nonreligious subjects 
(see Model 3 in Table 4). 
                                                 
14By pooling observations for individuals within each block of ten rounds, we have adopted a very 
conservative approach to dealing with the non-independence of multiple observations for each subjects.  As an 
alternative, we have also estimated these models using each round of play as the unit of observation; this method 
gives us 30 observations per subject, so we also controlled for subject random effects and included indicators for 
each rounds.  This alternative procedure had no substantive effect on our results.  Consequently, we are more 
confident that the absence of a significant effect of religion on voluntary contributions is not an artifact of an overly 
strict correction for non-independent round-by-round observations. 
In Table 5, we describe our findings for the return ratio.  As with amount sent, religious affiliation has a 
consistently negative, but insignificant effect; further, Catholics and Protestants behave in a very similar fashion.  In 
addition, as was the case with voluntary contributions, nonreligious subjects return less than high-attenders, but more 
 
 12 
than individuals who attend services just once per month.  However, the religious attendance indicators are not 
individually or jointly significant.  Nevertheless, there is an interesting contrast between the amount sent and 
amount returned by subjects who frequently attend religious services: these subjects appear less trusting, but more 
willing to reciprocate. 
Thus far, we have not found overwhelming evidence that either religion or religiosity is meaningfully 
related to behavior in public goods or trust games.  If anything, our findings regarding voluntary contributions and 
trustworthiness suggest more of a difference among religious subjects based on rates of participation in services, 
than between religious and nonreligious subjects; however, regarding trust, we observe just the opposite.  This is of 
course subject to the paucity of statistically significant differences, and our earlier caveat regarding the artificially 
egalitarian environment of the experimental lab. 
As a check on whether the laboratory environment itself dampens the effects of religion and religiosity in 
these experiments, we now examine whether induced heterogeneity (through variation in the fixed show-up 
payment) reveals any significant differences in behavior.  Accordingly, we reconsider the models above, but now 
interact the religion and attendance variables with an indicator for whether the fixed show-up payments were 
distributed equally or unequally.  In order to streamline the presentation of these interacted results, we now simply 
distinguish between any religious affiliation and none, and we distinguish only between never attending service (the 
omitted category), attendance once per month, and attendance more than once per month. 
Table 6 contains our results for this analysis of the group account contributions.  The estimates from Model 
1 demonstrate that the inequality treatment significantly reduces average contributions (as in Anderson, Mellor and 
Milyo 2004), even when controlling for religion and religiosity of subjects.  However, the interacted effects of 
inequality and religion or religiosity are neither individually nor jointly significant (see Models 2 and 3 in Table 6).  
Even so, the findings from Models 2 and 3 indicate that once we interact religion and religiosity with the inequality 
indicator, the effect of inequality itself is mitigated.  This suggests that the observed inequality effect in Model 1 is 
being driven in part by differences in behavior among religious subjects.  And counter to our earlier intuition, the 
interaction of inequality and religion (or religiosity) is negatively associated with contributions.  In particular, 
Model 3 indicates that low-attending subjects contribute about 0.6 fewer tokens in the inequality treatment; further, 
the attendance indicators in Model 3 are jointly significant (p<.05). 
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We also find evidence that both trusting and trustworthy behaviors are sensitive to the inequality treatment 
by religiosity.  For tokens sent by the first movers (Table 7), we find only one significant effect of inequality: more 
frequent attendance is associated with significantly fewer tokens sent in the inequality treatment (see Model 3 in 
Table 7).  The observed effect is also substantively large, as it is approximately 25% of the mean amount of tokens 
sent.  Finally, in Table 8, we examine the return ratio, which we characterize as trustworthy behavior.  As before, 
we observe only one significant interaction, but this time it is for occasional attendance and inequality (see Model 3 
in Table 8).  In addition, the estimated coefficient for this interaction is also large; occasional attenders in the 
inequality treatment return about 33% more tokens than the mean return ratio.  High attenders also return a higher 
fraction in the inequality treatment, but this interaction is not significant.  Nevertheless, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that these two attendance interactions have the same coefficient (p>.30).  Therefore, in the trust games 
we observe religious attendance having opposite effects on trust and trustworthiness within the inequality treatment. 
5. Conclusion 
We find that self-identified religious affiliation is unrelated to behavior in either the public goods or trust 
games.  However, religiosity, measured by attendance at services, shows some weak association with behavior in 
both games.  This suggests that future experimental research on the importance of religion might benefit from 
employing a combination of measures of religion, including religious affiliation (as in Fehr et al. 2003), participation 
in religious services (as in Eckel and Grossman 2004) and adherence to specific religious beliefs (as in Tan 2006). 
Overall, the experimental and survey evidence presented here provides at best mixed support for the claim 
that religiosity makes an individual more other-regarding.  Among subjects attending religious services, voluntary 
contributions in the public goods game increased with frequency of attendance.  In the trust games, religiosity was 
unrelated to behavior, except in the inequality treatment.  However, within the inequality treatment, individuals with 
the highest attendance rates at religious services were both less trusting and more trustworthy.  This sensitivity to 
induced inequality reinforces our concerns that the behavioral effects of religion and religiosity may be mitigated by 
the otherwise artificially egalitarian laboratory environment. 
It is also worth noting that the role of the second-mover in the trust experiment is similar to that of a subject in a 
dictator game.  However, Eckel and Grossman (2004) found religious participation to be unrelated to behavior in 
the dictator game; this contrasts somewhat with our findings on religiosity and “trustworthiness.” We conjecture that 
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the contextual differences in the second-mover’s role in the trust game (i.e. responding to the first mover) may be 
responsible for the observed differences in behavior compared to dictators in Eckel and Grossman’s experiment 
(also, recall that the receiver in their experiments was a secular charity).  Consequently, future experimental work 
on the importance of religion may need to incorporate framing, induced inequality or some other procedure (perhaps 
participation by older subjects) for the potential effects of religion and religiosity to be made manifest. 
Another aspect of the bilateral trust experiment is that trusting behavior by first movers is different from 
reciprocation by second movers (i.e., “trustworthiness”).  For example, we observe this in the differential effects of 
religiosity in the inequality treatment.  Elsewhere, Glaeser et al. (2000) report that survey-based measures of trust 
are poor predictors of trusting behavior in an experiment, but do predict trustworthiness.  Consequently, the 
seemingly contradictory effects of religiosity in trust games with induced inequality (i.e., reduced trust, but increased 
reciprocity) is not so surprising.  This weak but differential effect of religiosity on trust and reciprocity, which is 
less consistent with the maxim “do onto others,” than “an eye for an eye,” may warrant further investigation. 
Finally, we note that while observational studies often find that religion is associated with more 
cooperative, generous and trusting behavior; in the abstract laboratory setting religion appears to have less effect on 
behavior.  Why do religious individuals become more egoistic in the controlled environment?  Perhaps the Devil 
made them do it; however, we posit that the differences in observed behavior and outcomes between religious and 
nonreligious people may have more to do with differences in unobserved confounders, such as social environment or 
circumstances, than differences in preferences.  Once religious subjects are placed into a controlled environment 
like an experimental game, their behavior appears to be not consistently or dramatically more other-regarding than 
that of nonreligious persons.  This finding also echoes that in Anderson et al. (2005) in which we observe that 
liberal political ideology, often popularly associated with other-regarding preferences, also has little effect on 
individual behavior in public goods or trust games. 
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Table 1.  Experimental Design 
 
 
Session 
 
Experiment 
 
Block 1 
(10 rounds) 
Block 2 
(10 rounds) 
Block 3 
(10 rounds) 
 
Number of 
Subjects 
 
1-2 
 
Public Goods 
 
Egalitarian Skewed Symmetric 
 
16 
 
3-4 
 
Public Goods 
 
Skewed  Symmetric Egalitarian 
 
16 
 
5-6 
 
Public Goods 
 
Symmetric Egalitarian Skewed 
 
16 
 
 
 
Total Subjects in the Public Goods Experiment 
 
48 
 
7-10 
 
Trust 
 
Egalitarian Skewed Symmetric 
 
32 
 
11-14 
 
Trust 
 
Skewed  Symmetric Egalitarian 
 
32 
 
15-18 
 
Trust 
 
Symmetric Egalitarian Skewed 
 
32 
 
 
 
Total Subjects in the Trust Experiment 
 
96 
 
Notes: Egalitarian show-up payments = (8 @ $7.50) 
             Skewed show-up payments = (1 @ $20, 4 @ $7, 3 @ $4) 
             Symmetric show-up payments = (3 @ $10, 2 @ $7.50, 3 @ $5) 
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Table 2.  Mean Subject Decisions in Public Goods and Trust Experiments 
 
  
 
Public Goods 
Experiment 
Trust Experiment 
 
 
 
 
Mean Group Account 
Contribution 
 
Mean Tokens Sent to 
Second Mover 
 
Mean Ratio of Tokens 
Returned to First 
Mover to Tokens 
Available 
 
All Subjects 
 
 
2.72 
(1.58) 
n=47 
4.97 
(2.60) 
n=48 
 
0.34 
(0.18) 
n=46 
 
Any Religious Affiliation 
 
2.74 
(1.59) 
n=35 
4.63 
(2.53) 
n=36 
 
0.34 
(0.19) 
n=35 
 
Catholic 
 
2.52 
(1.64) 
n=13 
4.03 
(2.05) 
n=8 
 
0.35 
(0.22) 
n=9 
 
Protestant 
 
3.03 
(1.69) 
n=16 
4.67 
(2.34) 
n=20 
 
0.33 
(0.19) 
n=13 
 
Other 
 
2.44 
(1.24) 
n=6 
5.13 
(3.50) 
n=8 
 
0.34 
(0.17) 
n=13 
 
Attends services once a 
month 
 
2.01 
(1.47) 
n=13 
4.67 
(2.20) 
n=11 
 
0.35 
(0.17) 
n=5 
 
Attends services two or three 
times a month  
 
 3.12 
(1.00) 
n=8 
5.18 
(1.88) 
n=13 
 
 0.33 
(0.16) 
n=9 
 
Attends services four times a 
month or more 
 
3.28 
(1.65) 
n=11 
3.70 
(3.30) 
n=7 
 
0.35 
(0.14) 
n=11 
 
Notes: Cell entries are the mean values of subject choices taken over 30 decision making periods in each  
experiment; standard errors are in parentheses.  Three subjects did not complete the survey questions on religion 
and so are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 3.  Effects of Religiosity on Group Account Contributions  
 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Model 4 
 
Any Religious Affiliation  
 
0.214 
(0.36) 
  -0.020 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
Catholic 
 
 -0.058 
(0.08) 
 
 
-0.420 
(0.54) 
 
Protestant 
 
 0.428 
(0.66) 
 
 
0.279 
(0.33) 
 
Other 
 
 
 -0.021 
(0.03) 
 
 
-0.400 
(0.54) 
 
Attends services once a 
month 
 
  -0.775 
(1.01) 
 
-0.847 
(1.04) 
 
Attends services two or three 
times a month 
 
  0.393 
(0.55) 
 
0.407 
(0.56) 
 
Attends services four times a 
month or more 
 
  0.793 
(0.98) 
 
0.848 
(1.00) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the mean contribution by an individual within each ten round block (n=141) ;  
standard errors are corrected for clustering at the level of the individual.  Coefficients from OLS estimation are 
reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.  All models include controls for race, gender, the fixed 
payment to the individual, unequal versus equal fixed payment distribution, and the order of blocks within the 
session.  Statistical significance is indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level,  ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level. 
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Table 4.  Effects of Religiosity on Amount Sent in Trust Experiments  
 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Model 4 
 
Any Religious Affiliation  
 
-1.356 
(1.47) 
  -1.004 
(1.04) 
 
 
 
Catholic 
 
 -1.762 
(1.47) 
 
 
-1.588 
(1.44) 
 
Protestant 
 
 -1.414 
(1.45) 
 
 
-0.993 
(0.93) 
 
Other 
 
 
 -0.846 
(0.62) 
 
 
-0.493 
(0.34) 
 
Attends services once a 
month 
 
  -0.504 
(0.53) 
 
-0.729 
(0.72) 
 
Attends services two or three 
times a month 
 
  0.019 
(0.02) 
 
0.074 
(0.08) 
 
Attends services four times a 
month or more 
 
  -1.491 
(1.08) 
 
-1.432 
(1.01) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the mean contribution by an individual within each ten round block (n=144);  
standard errors are corrected for clustering at the level of the individual.  Coefficients from OLS estimation are 
reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.  All models include controls for race, gender, the fixed 
payment to the individual, unequal versus equal fixed payment distribution, and the order of blocks within the 
session.  Statistical significance is indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level,  ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level. 
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Table 5.  Effects of Religiosity on Return Ratio in Trust Experiments  
 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Model 4 
 
Any Religious Affiliation  
 
-0.031 
(0.53) 
  -0.043 
(0.66) 
 
 
 
Catholic 
 
 -0.013 
(0.15) 
 
 
-0.021 
(0.24) 
 
Protestant 
 
 -0.021 
(0.29) 
 
 
-0.032 
(0.40) 
 
Other 
 
 
 -0.055 
(0.83) 
 
 
-0.067 
(0.92) 
 
Attends services once a 
month 
 
  -0.006 
(0.08) 
 
-0.019 
(0.22) 
 
Attends services two or three 
times a month 
 
  0.021 
(0.30) 
 
0.019 
(0.27) 
 
Attends services four times a 
month or more 
 
  0.054 
(0.77) 
 
0.050 
(0.70) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the mean contribution by an individual within each ten round block (n=138) ;  
standard errors are corrected for clustering at the level of the individual.  Coefficients from OLS estimation are 
reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.  All models include controls for race, gender, amount 
sent, the fixed payment to the individual, unequal versus equal fixed payment distribution, and the order of blocks 
within the session.  Statistical significance is indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level,  ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 
0.10 level. 
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Table 6.  Effects of Inequality and Religiosity on Group Account Contributions 
 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  
 
Model 3  
 
Inequality Treatment 
 
-0.440* 
(1.97) 
-0.222 
(0.50) 
 
-0.122 
(0.24) 
 
Any Religious Affiliation 
 
0.013 
(0.02) 
0.208 
(0.24) 
 
0.143 
(0.18) 
 
Attends services once a month 
 
-0.786 
(1.03) 
-0.786 
(1.03) 
 
-0.385 
(0.43) 
 
Attends services more than once a 
month 
 
0.599 
(0.86) 
0.599 
(0.86) 
 
0.609 
(0.83) 
 
Any Religious Affiliation * 
Inequality  
 
 -0.293 
(0.56) 
 
-0.195 
(0.48) 
 
Attends services once a month * 
Inequality  
 
  
 
-0.605 
(1.11) 
 
Attends services more than once a 
month * Inequality  
 
  
 
-0.012 
(0.03) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the mean contribution by an individual within each ten round block (n=141) ;  
standard errors are corrected for clustering at the level of the individual.  Coefficients from OLS estimation are 
reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.  All models include controls for race, gender, the fixed 
payment to the individual, unequal versus equal fixed payment distribution, and the order of blocks within the 
session.  Statistical significance is indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level,  ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level. 
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Table 7.  Effects of Inequality and Religiosity on Amount Sent in Trust Experiments  
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Inequality Treatment -0.370 
(1.24) 
0.165 
(0.48) 
0.205 
(0.52) 
 
Any Religious Affiliation -1.110 
(1.17) 
-0.639 
(0.63) 
-1.033 
(0.99) 
 
Attends services once a 
month 
-0.474 
(0.50) 
-0.473 
(0.49) 
-0.586 
(0.54) 
 
Attends services more than 
once a month 
-0.477 
(0.52) 
-0.476 
(0.52) 
0.361 
(0.34) 
 
Any Religious Affiliation * 
Inequality  
 -0.711 
(1.31) 
-0.119 
(0.21) 
 
Attends services once a 
month * Inequality  
  0.168 
(0.26) 
 
Attends services more than 
once a month * Inequality  
  -1.257 
(1.91)* 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the mean contribution by an individual within each ten round block (n=144) ;  
standard errors are corrected for clustering at the level of the individual.  Coefficients from OLS estimation are 
reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.  All models include controls for race, gender, the fixed 
payment to the individual, unequal versus equal fixed payment distribution, and the order of blocks within the 
session.  Statistical significance is indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level,  ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level. 
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Table 8.  Effects of Inequality and Religiosity on Return Ratio in Trust Experiments  
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Inequality Treatment -0.011 
(0.08) 
-0.010 
(0.73) 
-0.030 
(1.74)* 
 
Any Religious Affiliation -0.042 
(0.65) 
-0.041 
(0.59) 
-0.030 
(0.43) 
 
Attends services once a 
month 
-0.006 
(0.36) 
-0.006 
(0.07) 
-0.070 
(0.83) 
 
Attends services more than 
once a month 
0.039 
(0.62) 
0.039 
(0.62) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
 
Any Religious Affiliation * 
Inequality  
 -0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.018 
(0.66) 
 
Attends services once a 
month * Inequality  
  0.096 
(1.97)* 
 
Attends services more than 
once a month * Inequality  
  0.051 
(1.21) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the mean contribution by an individual within each ten round block (n=138) ;  
standard errors are corrected for clustering at the level of the individual.  Coefficients from OLS estimation are 
reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.  All models include controls for race, gender, amount 
sent, the fixed payment to the individual, unequal versus equal fixed payment distribution, and the order of blocks 
within the session.  Statistical significance is indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level, ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 
0.10 level. 
